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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether Japanese people were happy and unhappy with the 
general election conducted on September 11, 2005, in which the Prime Minister, 
Koizumi, won a landslide victory. We conducted a large survey just after the election to 
ask people how happy they were and which party they had supported. Although there 
are consistent tendencies that supporters of ruling parties were happier and supporters of 
opposition parties were unhappier, the effect was not significant. Considering the results 
of a previous study that showed that Americans demonstrated significant responses to 
the result of a presidential election, this study suggests that Japanese people are 
indifferent to politics.  
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1.  Introduction 
To what extent are people interested in politics? Standard economic theory assumes that 
people’s utility depends on their own consumption, and so the importance of political 
institutions is often disregarded, although the latter essentially determine overall 
economic outcomes. Of course, people admit that the political system is an 
infrastructure necessary to achieve high economic performance and is very important 
from the view point of improving the level of happiness of people (Frey and Stutzer, 
2002).  
Nevertheless, many people do not participate in political activities because the 
political system is seen as a public good that can be free-ridden. On the other hand, the 
political process can be regarded as a battle between two competing opinions rather than 
the provision of public goods. However, even in this case, people tend to think that they 
are too small and helpless to influence the outcome, and so they do not participate in 
political activities. This is also a kind of a free-rider problem within a political group. In 
fact, the voting rate has been declining in many countries, including Japan and the U.S., 
and indifference to politics is an important social problem in democratic countries.  
This paper investigates whether Japanese people were happy and unhappy with the 
election outcomes. Although democratic countries worry about their nations’ 
indifference to politics, there are no good ways to measure the degree of interest in an 
election amongst a nation’s population. Asking people about their happiness after an 
election and comparing the levels of happiness of winners and losers may be a good 
method to measure their interest in an election; people who are interested in victory or 
defeat in an election should become happy or unhappy with the results. Nevertheless, 
there have been only a few studies, to our knowledge, that have investigated the degree 
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of happiness amongst voters (Wilson et al., 2003 and Gilbert et al., 1998). These 
previous studies asked only 52 and 57 voters respectively; therefore, these results 
cannot be seen as a convincingly robust representation of any tendency in the United 
States. We conducted a large survey in which we obtained about 1400 responses every 
month, randomly sampled from all over Japan. Thus, this is the first comprehensive 
study to investigate how much people are interested in an election. 
Our study is also unique from the viewpoint of studying the degree of happiness 
with results. Most of the surveys on happiness ask people about their overall feeling of 
happiness.1 The typical question is Overall, to what degree are you currently feeling 
happy? This type of question neglects an important characteristic of the feeling of 
happiness, i.e., that it fluctuates in line with news and personal events (Kimball and 
Willis, 2006). In contrast, this study focuses on how people’s happiness is influenced by 
macro news such as election results. In order to investigate how happiness depends on 
news and personal events, we conducted a survey on happiness every month with 
respondents in Japan and asked them about their current feeling.2 
In this paper, we analyze the effect of the general election conducted on 
September 11, 2005. This election was a rather heated one and the Koizumi Cabinet 
won an overwhelming victory that exceeded predictions by the media. Surprisingly, our 
study does not find any significant change in happiness amongst winners or losers, 
suggesting that Japanese people are indifferent to politics.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we first explain how the 
election was conducted and provide an outline of our survey. Then, we show that there 
                                                  
1 Kahneman et al. (2004) is a notable exception. They asked 900 working women on their 
change in happiness during the course of a day. 
2 We conducted a similar survey in the U.S., from which we found that Hurricane Katrina made 
Americans significantly unhappy. See Kimball et al. (2006).  
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is a tendency for supporters of ruling parties to become happier and for those of 
opposition parties to become unhappier, but that this tendency is insignificant. In 
section 3, by looking at the level of happiness over the six days following the election, 
we examine how the elation and dismay at the result of the election faded away. In 
section 4, we analyze the happiness of cabinet supporters. In section 5, we examine 
whether the happiness of voters was affected by the win or loss of their candidates. 
Section 6 is devoted to discussion of our findings and conclusions that can be drawn 
from them.  
 
2.  Did Japanese become happy and unhappy according to their political 
allegiance? 
2.1.  The general election on September 11, 2005 
The general election was conducted on Sunday, September 11, 2005, and the Prime 
Minister, Koizumi, won a landslide victory. The Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter 
LDP) carried 296 seats of the 480 seats in the House of Representatives. Combining 
these with the seats carried by New Komeito (Komei), with which the LDP has 
concluded an alliance, the ruling parties carried over 2/3 (327/480) of the seats in the 
House of Representatives. The Japanese Diet consists of the House of Representatives 
and the House of Councilors, and to be approved, bills should clear both. However, 
even if they are rejected in the House of Councilors after approval by the House of 
Representatives, they are approved if they win over 2/3 of the votes in the House of 
Representatives on a second vote. Therefore, the victory of over 2/3 of the seats in the 
House of Representatives implies that Prime Minister Koizumi can pass any bill that he 
wants. 
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To understand why this election result is important, we need to explain the 
situation under which Koizumi dissolved the House of Representatives on August 8. 
The alliance of the LDP and Komei commanded a majority in both Houses; therefore, in 
principle, they could have passed any bill. However, the privatization of the Japan 
Postal Service Public Corporation, which was the most important public promise made 
by Koizumi, met strong opposition from many Diet members of the LDP. In 
consequence, the bill passed the House of Representatives by a close margin, but was 
rejected in the House of Councilors on August 8. Prime Minister Koizumi dissolved the 
House of Representatives at once, saying that he wanted to ask the nation’s opinion on 
the privatization. Thus, the general election became a kind of national referendum on 
the policy of the reform of postal services. How this election attracted the nation’s 
attention was reflected in the high turnout rate of voters: 68 % this time around, as 
against 60% at the last general election. The main events reported in newspapers during 
the period from August to October can be found in the Appendix. 
 
2.2  Our survey 
We conducted monthly surveys from August 2005 to February 2006, and focused on the 
impact of the general election conducted on September 11, 2005.  
Let us explain the outline of our survey, taking the September survey as an 
example. The surveys in the other months have similar features. In each case, 2000 
people over 20 years old were randomly selected from all over Japan and interviewed.3 
In the September survey, the number of effective responses was 1399; the response rate 
was 70.0%. The survey was conducted from September 13 to 20, and the number of 
                                                  
3 The survey is not a panel. Different people are randomly chosen every time. 
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respondents on each date is shown in Table 1.4 
653 respondents (46.7%) were male and 746 (53.3%) were female. In terms of age, 
10.4% were 20–29 years old, 18% were 30–39 years old, 17% were 40–49 years old, 
22% were 50–59 years old, and 33% were over 60 years old. As for academic 
background, 15% had been to a grade school, 52% had a high school education, and 
32% had been to an university. We also have the data on their household income, 
occupation, residence location, and the size of cities, as well as their attitude towards the 
Koizumi Cabinet, which party they support, and their view on the state of business.5 
749 respondents (53.5%) supported the Koizumi Cabinet, 416 (29.7%) were 
opposed to it, and 234 (16.7%) answered “do not know.” The parties supported by 
respondents are shown in Table 2. 32% supported the LDP and 15% supported the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DP), while 42% did not support any party. Thus, how to 
attract those who did not support a specific party was the key, and according to exit 
polls, about a half of them voted for the LDP, leading to the victory of Koizumi. 
As for happiness, the following question was asked: 
Please remember how you felt in this one week. To what degree were you feeling happy 
in the last week? On a scale of 0−10, where “10” is “very happy” and “0” is “very 
unhappy,” how do you rate your level of happiness in the last week? 
 
We define a variable, Happiness, for this value. The results of the survey conducted 
in September are shown in Table 3. Out of 1399, those who chose 5 formed the largest 
group (397 = 28.4%), and those who chose 6, 7, or 8 numbered over 200 each (about 
15%). The average happiness value was 6.3.6  
                                                  
4 Although one answer and four answers were obtained on September 13 and 20, respectively, 
we disregard them when analyzing the effect on each day because they are very few in number. 
5 Household income has not been asked in the surveys for several months. 
6 A similar question about overall happiness has been asked in the “survey of preference on life 
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2.3  Level of happiness of Supporters of ruling parties 
We want to investigate whether the level of happiness of supporters of the ruling parties 
rose from August to September, and whether the degree of happiness of supporters of 
opposition parties fell during the same period. In this subsection, we calculate the 
averages of happiness for these groups for each month in order to compare them. Since 
happiness changes from month to month due to various reasons, we must be careful to 
adjust the figures to allow for this variation caused by events other than the election.  
As can be seen from Figure 1, the average happiness of all respondents 
substantially varied over the period. In particular, we are interested in the change in 
happiness from August to September and the figures show that the average level of 
happiness of all respondents in August is higher than that in September. Thus, if we find 
a decrease in happiness amongst supporters of the ruling parties in September, it does 
not necessarily imply that the election results affected the supporters in a negative way. 
In order to identify the effect of the election results on the level of happiness amongst 
supporters of the ruling and opposition parties, it is necessary to adjust the change in 
average happiness between months. To do so, we divide the happiness of supporters of 
ruling and opposition parties by the average happiness of all respondents for each 
month. 
Indeed, happiness amongst supporters of the ruling parties in September was 
lower than that in August. However, when we adjust the change in average happiness of 
all respondents, the outcome is reversed. The dark color columns in Figure 2, which 
represent the level of normalized happiness, reveal that supporters of the ruling parties 
                                                                                                                                                  
in Japan.” The results (the average and distribution) are quite similar.  
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rose in September, declined until December, and rose again in January and February. 
The rise in September may be due to the victory in the election. 
The grey color columns in Figure 2 represent the normalized happiness of 
supporters of opposition parties. The normalized happiness fell in September, fell even 
more in October before going up until January.7 The result that the level of happiness 
fell in September is consistent with the notion that it was caused by the defeat in the 
election. However, one may argue that the result that it fell more in October than in 
September makes this an unreasonable explanation.  
Our survey also asks whether or not people support the Koizumi Cabinet. 
According to the results, a large proportion of supporters of opposition parties also 
supported the Koizumi Cabinet in September. This is not strange because the Prime 
Minister, Koizumi, claims that he is the real reformer of the LDP, and so people who are 
against the LDP may, nonetheless, support Koizumi. They may have felt happy to hear 
that Koizumi won.  
 Considering this fact, it may be appropriate to focus on the happiness of those 
who supported the opposition and did not support the Koizumi Cabinet. The light color 
columns in Figure 2 represent the results, which reveal that the happiness of those 
people fell in September and rose in October, and then continued to go up until 
December. This result is consistent with the supposition that people who were against 
both Koizumi and the LDP became unhappy with the defeat in the general election in 
September, 2005. 
The ruling party consists of the LDP and Komei, while the opposition consists of 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DP), the Japanese Communist Party (Communist), the 
                                                  
7 Original happiness of supporters of opposition parties before normalization fell in September.  
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Social Democratic Party (SDP), the People’s New Party (PNP), and New Party Nippon 
(NPN). Let us examine whether the results on ruling and opposition parties mentioned 
above apply for each party. The supporters of Communist, SDP, PNP, and NPN are too 
few to get reliable statistics for each party; therefore, we aggregated the supporters of 
these small parties into one group (SMALL) and considered the LDP, Komei, DP, and 
SMALL.  
The dark color columns in Figure 3 show the results for the LDP. The level of 
happiness rose in September. However, the difference from August to September was 
only 0.004 and the happiness rose more in October. Thus, the rise in happiness of LDP 
supporters was small in September. 
 The light color columns in Figure 3 show the results for Komei. The level of 
happiness rose in September and fell in October. The difference from August to 
September is 0.04, which is ten times larger than that of supporters of the LDP. Thus, 
the rise in happiness of Komei (the smaller ruling party) supporters is more pronounced 
than that of LDP (the larger ruling party) supporters. 
The dark color columns in Figure 4 show the results for the DP. The level of 
happiness fell in September and rose in October. However, the difference from August 
to September was only 0.001. 
The grey color columns in Figure 4 show the results for SMALL, i.e., Communist, 
SDP, NPN, and PNP taken together. The level of happiness fell in September. The 
difference from August was 0.04, which is forty times larger than that for the DP. Thus, 
the fall in happiness of SMALL’s supporters was more pronounced than that of DP’s 
supporters. Considering the results for the LDP and Komei together, these results 
suggest that the supporters of smaller parties were more strongly affected by the results 
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of the election. 
However, the result that the level of happiness dropped much more in October than 
in September is strange. This may be due to the fact that a considerable proportion of 
the supporters of opposition parties also supported the Koizumi Cabinet. For example, 
among the 32 supporters of Communist in September, 19 did not support the Cabinet 
and ten did support the Cabinet.8 The average happiness of the former group was 5.2, 
while that of the latter was 8.0. Thus, in September, the anti-cabinet Communist 
supporters were much unhappier than pro-cabinet Communist supporters. 
To get rid of the bias from pro-cabinet supporters of opposition parties, we show 
the happiness of supporters of SMALL who were anti-cabinet as the light color columns 
in Figure 4. Their level of happiness fell in September by almost 0.10. While the 
happiness was lower in October than in September, the change between September and 
October was only half that between August and September. 
   The results in Figures 2–4 suggest that the supporters of ruling parties felt relatively 
happy in September than in August, while those of opposition parties felt less happy in 
September than in August. Considering that the survey was conducted a few days after 
the election, the landslide victory of Koizumi may be the cause of this rise and fall in 
happiness. The effect was larger for the supporters of smaller parties; for ruling parties, 
the effect on Komei was larger than that on the LDP, and for the opposition parties, the 
effect on SMALL was larger than that on the DP.  
 
2.4  Is the change significant? 
In this subsection, we examine whether the rise and fall in the level of happiness in 
                                                  
8 Three answered ‘do not know’. 
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September is significant. To test the significance of the change in happiness of 
supporters of the ruling parties, we estimate the following equation.9 
iiiiiii
iiiiii
iiiiiii
FEBJANDECNOVOCTSEPDRULE
DRULEFEBDRULEJANDRULEDEC
DRULENOVDRULEOCTDRULESEPHappiness
7654321
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4321
βββββββ
ααα
αααα
+++++++
×+×+×+
×+×+×+=
  (1) 
where AUG, SEP, OCT, NOV, DEC, JAN, and FEB are dummy variables standing for 
each month. DRULE is a dummy variable, which is 1 if the respondent is a supporter of 
ruling parties and 0 otherwise. Subscript i stands for the respondents from August to 
February (i= 1,…,8592). The change in happiness of supporters of ruling parties from 
August to September is measured by the coefficient of SEP×DRULE, 2α .  
The estimates of (1) are shown in Table 4, which reveal that average happiness in 
September is significantly lower (at the 5% level) than that in August (see SEP).10 
Supporters of the ruling parties are significantly happier (at the 5% level) than others 
(see DRULE). The supporters of the ruling parties were happier in September than in 
August, but this is not significant (p-value is 0.315, see DRULE*SEP). However, the 
coefficient is larger and more significant than those of other months, suggesting that this 
coefficient may reflect the impact of the election. 
    We estimate equations similar to (1) for the supporters of opposition parties, 
SMALL (Communist, SDP, NPN, and PNP), LDP, and Komei.11 In order to save space, 
only the estimates of 2α  are presented in Table 5. The indicators are consistent with 
our expectation in all cases: those belonging to ruling parties, LDP, and Komei, are 
positive, while those belonging to opposition parties, SMALL, and SMALL cum 
anti-cabinet, are negative. This suggests that the results may not be accidental. However, 
                                                  
9 Alternatively, we could test the mean difference of the normalized happiness in August and 
September. 
10 The average happiness is also significantly lower in February. 
11 DRULE in equation (1) is replaced with corresponding dummy variables. 
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the estimates are all insignificant, suggesting that the effect of political events on the 
happiness of the Japanese was quite limited, if it existed at all. The coefficient is larger 
for Komei and SMALL (cum non-cabinet supporter) compared with the LDP and the 
opposition parties in total, suggesting that the supporters of smaller parties like Komei, 
Communist, and SDP have stronger loyalty than supporters of larger parties like the 
LDP and DP.12 
 
3.  Daily change in happiness in September 
Happiness of supporters of political parties varies over a period of months, as shown in 
Figures 2–4. However, it is not likely that the effect of the election results on the 
happiness of average Japanese people lasts over months. The effect, if it exists, should 
fade away in a shorter period. Kimball et al. (2006) showed that Hurricane Katrina 
made American people unhappier, but the effect faded away within a week. In this 
section, we investigate, by looking at the daily data, how long the effect of the election 
lasted. 
The survey was conducted from September 13 to 20. The number of respondents 
on each date, shown in Table 1, varies from 150 to 350, with the exception of 
September 13 and 20.13 
    We calculate average happiness of supporters of ruling parties each day. Since 
happiness possibly fluctuated in line with macro news every day, we divide the average 
by the mean of happiness of all respondents for each day. No specific trend is observed 
(figure is not shown in order to save space). 
                                                  
12 These estimates are not significant, probably because the number of supporters is small. 
13 Although one answer and four answers were obtained on September 13 and 20, respectively, 
we disregard them when we analyze the effect for each day because they are very few in 
number. 
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The results of the supporters of Komei are represented by the dark color columns 
in Figure 5. The average happiness declined from September 14 to 16, while the trend 
thereafter is unclear.  
The light color columns in Figure 5 represent the results of opposition parties.14 The 
level of happiness rose from September 14 to 17 and thereafter declined. These two 
results in Figure 5 may suggest that the effect of the election results lasted until 
September 16 or 17. 
To examine if this change in happiness by day is significant, we estimate the 
following equation: 
iiiiii
iiiii
iiiiii
DAYDRULEbDAYDRULEbDAYDRULEb
DAYDRULEbDAYDRULEbDRULEb
DAYaDAYaDAYaDAYaDAYaaHappiness
191817
1615
1918171615
543
210
543210
×+×+×+
×+×++
+++++=
 (2) 
where DAY15 stands for a dummy variable for September 15 and so on. i stands for 
respondents of the September survey (i = 1,…, 1361). 1b  represents the discrepancy in 
happiness of supporters of ruling parties between September 15 and 14. The coefficients 
b1–b5 are not significant (results are not shown). The coefficients for supporters of 
Komei and opposition parties are not significant either. Therefore, the day-effect in 
Figure 5 is weak, if it exists. 
 
4.  Happiness of cabinet supporters 
Who carried the day; the LDP or Koizumi? This is the question asked by the media after 
the election. The answer was Koizumi. It may be interesting to see if the cabinet 
supporters were happier than supporters of each party in September.  
                                                  
14 We expected that the happiness of supporters of SMALL would show a clearer pattern. 
Unfortunately, the analysis of “smaller opposition parties” is impossible because the 
observations are too few in number. 
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The dark color columns in Figure 6 represent the average happiness of cabinet 
supporters in each month divided by the average happiness of all respondents for each 
month.15 Unexpectedly, the normalized happiness of cabinet supporters declined in 
September. The grey color columns in Figure 6 represent the happiness of anti-cabinet 
supporters. Their happiness also declined in September. These results mean that only 
those who answered “do not know” were happier in September, as shown by the light 
color columns in Figure 6.  
Why did this happen? There are two key facts to consider. The first is that the 
number of cabinet supporters increased from 549 in August to 733 in September (see 
Table 6). The other is that cabinet supporters are always happier than anti-cabinet 
supporters; 6.62 as against 6.20 in August. Given these facts, a possible explanation for 
the fall of happiness of pro-cabinet supporters is as follows. The increase in the number 
of pro-cabinet supporters means that many people who would not have been pro-cabinet 
in September, if the exogenous factors such as occurrence of the general election had 
been the same as in August, actually changed their opinion to pro-cabinet. Since 
non-pro-cabinet are generally unhappier than pro-cabinet, this shift produces a 
downward bias of happiness of cabinet supporters in September. In short, the number of 
people who support the cabinet is endogenously determined and an increase in their 
number implies the inclusion of unhappier people into this category.  
Thus, to measure the effect of the victory in the election on the level of happiness 
amongst pro-cabinet supporters, we need to identify imaginary cabinet supporters in 
September who were also pro-cabinet in August. Since the survey chooses different 
random samples every month and our sample is not panel data, we need to estimate 
                                                  
15 Cabinet supporters are consistently happier than anti-cabinet supporters.  
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hypothesized pro-cabinet supporters.  
To solve this problem, we first estimate a model that explains what type of people 
tend to support the Koizumi Cabinet. Adopting all the information available in our 
survey, we estimate the following equation: 
iiiii
iii
iiii
iiii
iiii
iiii
iiiiii
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GOODBCaSHIKOKUaTYUGOKUa
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MANAGEFREEaFIELDaEAGRICULTURaOTHERCITYa
YLARGE15CITaSCHOOLaAGEaDMANaGOODNEWSaaDCAB
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                                                                   (3)  
where DCAB is a dummy variable, which is 1 when a respondent supports the Koizumi 
Cabinet and 0 otherwise. GOODNEWS is a variable that takes a value from 1 to 12 
corresponding to the range between “they had very good personal news or event in the 
last week” and “they had very bad personal news or event in the last week.” DMAN is a 
dummy variable, which is 1 when a respondent is a man and 0 otherwise. AGE is the 
age of each respondent, SCHOOL is a variable which takes 1 if the respondent’s 
academic education is grade school, 2 if high school, and 3 if university. LARGE15CITY 
is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a respondent lives in one of the 15 largest cities in 
Japan and 0 otherwise. OTHERCITY is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the respondent 
lives in the other cities. Variables from AGRICULTURE to OTHERJOB are dummy 
variables that take 1 if a respondent engages in a certain occupation. Variables from 
HOKKAIDO to SIKOKU stand for a dummy variable representing regions in Japan. 
GOODBC is a variable that takes a value from 1 to 5 corresponding to “business 
condition definitely becomes better” to “business condition definitely becomes worse.” 
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Variables from SLDP to SSDP are dummy variables for supporters of each party. 
Subscript i stands for all respondents of the whole period (i = 1,…, 8592). 
Using all the data from August to February, we estimate (3) with a probit. The 
estimation results are shown in Table 7. Those who have higher education, who think 
that business condition becomes better, and who got good personal news in the last 
week tend to be cabinet supporters. Some regions are significant: HOKKAIDO and 
KOSINETSU have negative indicators, while KEIHIN and KINKI have positive 
indicators. Naturally, the LDP and Komei supporters also tended to support the cabinet, 
whilst DP, Communist, and SDP supporters tended to be anti-cabinet. 
Then, using these estimates, we construct the fitted value for each respondent, and 
transform it into a probability with CNORM (fitted value), where CNORM stands for 
the cumulative normal distribution. The number of cabinet supporters was 521 and at its 
lowest in August; therefore, we select the top 521 respondents based on the probability 
from those who answered “pro-cabinet” in the survey for each month.16 
The average happiness of these 521 hypothetical pro-cabinet supporters for each 
month, normalized by the average happiness of all respondents for each month, is 
presented in Figure 7. The normalized average happiness of cabinet supporters rose in 
September, then declined until December, and went up thereafter. In contrast to Figure 6, 
happiness in September is higher than that in August. This outcome confirms that the 
reason why the happiness of pro-cabinet supporters declined in September is the sharp 
increase in pro-cabinet supporters in September who are unhappier than cabinet 
supporters. Once the endogeneity of cabinet supporters is adjusted by picking up the 
                                                  
16 Alternatively, we can select the top 521 respondents disregarding the information on their 
answer of the pro-cabinet question. We believe, however, that the information is important, 
since R-squared of (3) is only 0.29.    
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same number of cabinet supporters, we found that their happiness rose relatively in 
September, suggesting that the victory in the general election was good news to 
pro-cabinet supporters. 
Is this rise in happiness significant? To investigate this, we use equation (1), in 
which DRULE is substituted by ADDCAB standing for a dummy variable that is 1 for 
521 hypothetical cabinet supporters and 0 otherwise. The results are shown in Table 8. 
SEP is negative, even though insignificant at the 10% level, suggesting that happiness 
declined in September. ADDCAB is significantly positive, suggesting that the 
hypothetical pro-cabinet supporters were happier than others. ADDCAB*SEP is positive, 
which suggests that the hypothetical pro-cabinet supporters were happier in September 
than in August; however, this value is not significant.  
The insignificant results raise the doubt that the rise in September is perhaps only 
accidental. However, considering that all the results on the rise and fall of happiness 
amongst supporters of the ruling parties, the opposition parties, and the cabinet are 
consistent with our supposition, it may be the case that the election results really 
affected the happiness of the Japanese, albeit only weakly.  
 
5. Number of elected representatives and happiness of the inhabitants 
The prefecture where each respondent lives was documented, so that it is possible to 
estimate the effect of the number of winners of the LDP by prefecture in the general 
election on the level of happiness of the LDP supporters.17 We construct a variable, 
WLDP, defined as (number of winners of LDP in a prefecture where a respondent 
                                                  
17 We also estimate the effect of the number of winners of parties other than the LDP, leading to 
insignificant results. There are small electoral districts and proportional electoral districts in the 
current Japanese electoral system. In this paper, we consider only the winners of the former 
districts because people are generally interested in small electoral districts. 
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lives)/(total number of winners (i.e., seats) of the prefecture). To examine whether LDP 
supporters became happier with the victory of the LDP in their home prefecture, we 
estimate the following equation. 
iiii WLDPSLDPaSLDPaaHappiness *210 ++=              (5) 
where SLDP is a dummy variable, which takes 1 if a respondent supports the LDP and 0 
otherwise. Subscript i stands for respondents in September (i = 1,…,1361) 
   The estimation results are presented in the first column of Table 9. Both coefficients, 
a1 and a2, have a positive indicator, but they are not significant. Thus, it can be said that 
LDP supporters did not care about the results of the election in their home prefecture.  
Incidentally, SLDP and the cross term are significant when Happiness is regressed 
on them separately, implying that LDP supporters are happier than others (see the 
second and third columns of Table 9). WLDP is also positive when Happiness is 
regressed on only this variable, suggesting that the LDP won in the prefectures where a 
larger proportion of the inhabitants support the LDP, and they tend to be happier (see 
the extreme right column of Table 9). 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper examined whether the landslide victory of the Koizumi Cabinet in the 
general election on September 11, 2005 made Japanese people happy and unhappy.  
Relative changes in happiness of supporters and non-supporters of ruling parties 
from August to September were not significant. However, we found that the indicators 
representing the effects are consistent with our expectation in most cases, which 
suggests that the Japanese people were only slightly happy and unhappy with the 
election results. 
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This result seems to imply that Japanese are quite indifferent to politics. However, 
we need to examine a couple of elements before drawing this conclusion. Our results 
could possibly have been obtained, even if the Japanese were deeply commited to 
politics. One possibility is that the election results were anticipated beforehand, and so 
the historic victory of Koizumi was not really a surprise. However, according to the 
articles based on polls before the election, this supposition is not correct. All predictions 
made by newspapers underestimated the number of seats gained by ruling parties. For 
example, the Asahi, based on their poll (118,616 responses), reported on September 4 
that the ruling parties would win 254 to 310 seats (their best estimate was 283). The 
Mainichi also announced their prediction on September 4, based on their poll (90,043 
respondents), that the ruling parties would win 275 to 327 (the average is 301) seats. In 
fact, the ruling parties won 327. Thus, the prediction in the media that the ruling parties 
would win the majority was proved correct, and so winning the majority itself was not a 
surprise. However, winning two thirds of the seats should have been a surprise.  
In addition, one important point is that this overwhelming victory may not be 
good news even to the supporters of ruling parties. The majority of people thought that 
Koizumi (or the ruling parties) won too many seats. Interestingly, according to polls 
after the election, about one third of those who had voted for the LDP answered that 
fewer seats for the ruling parties would have been better (the Nikkei and the Yomiuri, 
September 14). This suggests that one third of those who voted for the LDP may not be 
happy because the LDP won too many seats. They may have regretted that they had 
voted for the LDP, suggesting that many people supported the LDP only relatively, and 
not absolutely. This is an example of the fallacy of composition. Considering this fact, it 
is not surprising that supporters of ruling parties did not become significantly happier, 
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even if they were deeply interested in politics. However, the fact does not explain why 
supporters of opposition parties did not become significantly unhappier, even though 
they were not indifferent to politics. Thus, our survey results suggest that Japanese 
people are essentially indifferent to politics.  
The next question is whether the Japanese are more indifferent to politics than 
people in other countries. A good measure of people’s interest in politics may be the 
voting rate. The voting rate in the general elections in Japan has been declining over the 
years since the first general election in 1890, reaching about 60% in recent years. On the 
other hand, the voting rate in the presidential election in the U.S. was 51% in 2000. 
Thus, the voting rate is not low in Japan, at least for general elections. We should note, 
however, that people should register beforehand to vote in the U.S., while registration is 
not necessary in Japan.18 Thus, it is easier for Japanese to vote; therefore, a simple 
comparison may not be appropriate.19 
The voting rate has been declining over the years in many countries, and so the 
governments of these countries warn of the crisis of democracy and try to increase the 
voting rate. Although they lament people’s indifference to elections in their home 
countries, it is difficult to know which nation is more indifferent to elections because 
voting rates depend heavily on the electoral system.  
Another barometer for interest in politics may be the number of members of 
political parties. The number of registered Republicans in the United States is 
approximately 60 million, while the number of the members of the LDP in Japan is 1.2 
                                                  
18 The US registration rate was 75% in 2000. 
19 In France, where people need to register to vote, the voting rate for presidential elections has 
been over 70% over the last 30 years. As for the parliamentary elections in France, the voting 
rate has been around 60% since 1988, which implies a higher incentive for voting than applies 
in the Japanese case, considering the trouble of registration. 
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million.20 The number is much smaller in Japan than in the U.S., which emphasizes that 
politics is more popular in the U.S. than in Japan. However, a simple comparison may 
lead to a fallacy, since the definition of a party member is different in the two 
countries.21  
The two measures, voting rate and the number of members, are vulnerable to 
differences between the systems and do not offer reliable evidence for comparison of 
people’s indifference to politics. Rather, a survey on happiness of supporters of political 
parties like the one in this paper is expected to elucidate the degree of interest in 
elections. 
There have been two studies that examined the effect of election results on 
happiness of supporters of candidates. One is Gilbert et al. (1998), which analyzed 
happiness amongst 57 voters at a gubernatorial election in Texas in 1994. Losers were 
happier than winners both before and after the election; however, on the basis of 
evaluations one month after the election, there was no evidence that winners became 
happier than losers. Losers’ happiness was 5.00 just before the election and 5.33 one 
month after the election, while winners’ happiness was 4.10 and 4.40 before and after 
the election. The other study is Wilson et al. (2003), which investigated a U.S. 
presidential election in 2000. They asked 52 college students about their happiness one 
day after Gore conceded. Bush supporters were significantly (at the 1% level) happier 
than Gore supporters.22 However, since they chose only students who were especially 
                                                  
20  According to information provided by the Republican National Committee and from 
administration office of the LDP, respectively. 
21  Members of the LDP are required to pay 4000 yen as an annual fee, while nothing special is 
required for registration in the U.S. 
22 Since there were no significant differences in happiness between the two groups before the 
election, they subtracted people’s initial happiness from the happiness after the election to 
evaluate the change.   
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interested in politics, their significant results are not easily compared with  our 
insignificant results. 
Thus, whether an effect of the election results on happiness was established 
depended on when respondents were asked: in the U.S. the effect remained on the next 
day of the event, but didn’t remain after a month. We interviewed respondents three 
days after the election, which is closer to Wilson et al. (2003), suggesting that Japanese 
are more indifferent than Americans. Of course, we should be careful because of the 
fact that there is discrepancy of two days. Kimball et al. (2006) found that dismay 
caused by Hurricane Katrina faded away in a week; therefore, the difference of two 
days might have resulted in different outcomes.23 Unfortunately, we have no clue as to 
the answer to this question. 
                                                  
23 Whether the election attracted people’s attention may be another point. Both the general 
election in Japan and the Bush vs. Gore struggle attracted much attention: it is not easy to say 
which one is more focused on by the nations. 
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Table 1  Number of responses on each day in September survey 
 total 13-Sep 14-Sep 15-Sep 16-Sep
count 1399 1 149 192 183
proportion 
(%) 
100% 0.1 10.7 13.7 13.1
  17-Sep 18-Sep 19-Sep 20-Sep
count  327 353 190 4
proportion 
(%) 
 23.4 25.2 13.6 0.3
 
Table 2  Number of supporters for each party 
 total LDP DP Komei Communist SDP 
count 1399 446 207 61 32 23
proportion 
(%) 
100 31.9 14.8 4.4 2.3 1.6
  PNP NPN Other parties No party do not know 
count  3 1 3 589 34
proportion 
(%) 
 0.2 0.1 0.2 42.1 2.4
Note: Communist stands for Japanese Communist Party, SDP = Social Democratic Party, PNP 
= The People’s New Party, NPN = New Party Nippon. 
 
Table 3.  Happiness values in September survey 
 total 10 9 8 7 6 5
count 1399 82 69 242 211 203 397
proportion 
(%) 
100 5.9 4.9 17.3 15.1 14.5 28.4
  4 3 2 1 0 do not know
count  57 61 17 13 9 38
proportion 
(%) 
 4.1 4.4 1.2 0.9 0.6 2.7
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Table 4.  Estimates of equation (1) 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Constant 2.421 [.000] 
SEP -0.100 [.045] 
OCT -0.045 [.370] 
NOV 0.028 [.573] 
DEC -0.073 [.148] 
JAN 0.079 [.112] 
FEB -0.098 [.043] 
DRULE 0.130 [.044] 
DRULE *SEP 0.088 [.315] 
DRULE *OCT 0.038 [.670] 
DRULE *NOV -0.009 [.919] 
DRULE *DEC -0.039 [.664] 
DRULE *JAN -0.022 [.802] 
DRULE *FEB 0.046 [.614] 
R2 0.008  
number of 
observations 
8592  
 
 
Table 5.  Estimates of 2α : change in happiness from August to September for each 
party  
Party Coefficient p-value 
RULING PARTY 0.088  [.315] 
LDP 0.058 [.526] 
Komei  0.153 [.448] 
OPPOSITION PARTY -0.026 [.814] 
DP -0.012 [.924] 
SMALL -0.068  [.769] 
SMALL cum non-cabinet supporter -0.250 [.341] 
 
Table 6.  The number of cabinet supporters in August and September 
 August  September  
 number of respondents happiness number of respondents happiness
Pro-cabinet 549 6.62 733 6.46
Anti-cabinet 493 6.2 410 5.95
Others 315 6.2 218 6.14
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Table 7.  Characteristics of cabinet supporters 
Parameter Estimate P-value 
Constant -1.336 [.000]
GOODNEWS 0.017 [.012]
DMAN -0.057 [.119]
AGE 0.000 [.929]
SCHOOL 0.053 [.044]
LARGE15CITY 0.007 [.908]
OTHERCITY 0.027 [.530]
AGRICULTURE 0.045 [.697]
OFFICE 0.061 [.266]
FIELD 0.012 [.819]
FREE_MANAGE -0.121 [.194]
HOUSEWIFE -0.032 [.573]
STUDENT 0.123 [.348]
OTHERJOB 0.152 [.011]
HOKKAIDO -0.226 [.008]
TOHOKU 0.077 [.299]
KANTO 0.063 [.265]
KEIHIN 0.153 [.043]
KOSINETU -0.280 [.001]
HOKURIKU 0.137 [.199]
TOKAI -0.042 [.509]
KINKI 0.110 [.101]
HANSHIN 0.027 [.713]
TYUGOKU 0.047 [.543]
SIKOKU -0.118 [.221]
GOODBC 0.236 [.000]
SLDP 1.517 [.000]
SDP -0.393 [.000]
SKOMEI 1.138 [.000]
SCOMMUNIST -0.621 [.000]
SSDP -0.670 [.000]
R2 0.285  
number of 
observations 
8592  
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Table 8.  Significance of the rise in happiness of hypothetical pro-cabinet supporters 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
C 6.226 [.000]
SEP -0.120 [.234]
OCT -0.092 [.375]
NOV 0.105 [.307]
DEC -0.027 [.793]
JAN 0.199 [.050]
FEB -0.152 [.130]
ADDCAB 0.415 [.000]
ADDCAB*SEP 0.049 [.753]
ADDCAB*OCT 0.084 [.598]
ADDCAB*NOV -0.104 [.515]
ADDCAB*DEC -0.278 [.080]
ADDCAB*JAN -0.113 [.475]
ADDCAB*FEB -0.008 [.961]
R2 0.011 
Number of 
observations 
8592  
 
 
Table 9. Estimation results of equation (5) 
Variable Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Constant 6.148 [.000] 6.158 [.000] 6.148 [.000] 5.982 [.000]
SLDP 0.289 [.414]  0.337 [.003]  
SLDP*WLDP 0.064 [.887] 0.411 [.004]    
WLDP      0.378 [.114]
R2 0.005  0.005  0.006  0.007 
Number of 
observations 
1361  1361  1361  1361  
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Figure 1.  Average happiness of all respondents 
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Figure 2.  Normalized happiness of supporters of ruling parties, opposition parties, and 
those who support opposition but not the Koizumi Cabinet 
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Note: Normalized happiness is (average happiness of a group)/(average happiness of the whole 
sample). 
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Figure 3.  Normalized happiness of supporters of LDP and KOMEI 
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Figure 4.  Normalized happiness of supporters of DP, SMALL, and SMALL cum 
anti-cabinet 
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Figure 5.  Normalized happiness of supporters of Komei and opposition parties for 
each day 
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Figure 6.  Normalized happiness of pro-cabinet supporters, anti-cabinet supporters, and 
those who answered “do not know” 
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Figure 7.  Normalized happiness of hypothetical pro-cabinet supporters 
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Appendix 
 
Main events reported in the newspapers from July to October 
 
month survey day news 
July 
 
5 Bills for postal privatization were approved by the House 
of Representatives by a majority of five votes 
  8 Simultaneous suicide bombings in London 
  15 374 employees and contractors hired by asbestos product 
manufacturers have died from asbestos-related illnesses, 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said in a 
report 
  7/26-8/7 Six-nation talks aimed at scrapping North Korea's nuclear 
weapons were held 
  27 Space Shuttle launched 
    
August  2 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) announced its draft for 
nation's new constitution, Article 9 of the draft 
constitution stipulates that the Self-Defense Forces are 
to be maintained  
 ○ 5 The chair of Komei fraction at the House of Councilors 
opposed the postal privatization bills, massive opposition in 
the faction may arise 
 ○ 6 If the postal privatization bills are rejected at the House of 
Councilors, the House of Representatives will be dissolved 
immediately  
Tokyo stock market, fall across the board on 5th 
Suicide website murder suspect, Maeda, was arrested on 
5th 
 ○ 7 Suicide website murder, a body found 
 ○ 8 The postal privatization bills were rejected at the House of 
Councilors; the House of Representatives was dissolved 
On the Tokyo financial markets, temporarily all three 
(stocks, yen, and bonds) fell  
Suicide website murder, the third body was found 
  9 Upon dissolution of the House of Representatives, 
business world shows concern about bad effects on the 
economy  
   Heizo Takenaka, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
declared exit from phase of leveling off for Japanese 
Economy 
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  10 Space Shuttle returned back to the Earth 
  10-15 Suicide website murder related articles appear in 
newspapers 
  23-31 Hurricane Katrina formed, hit Southern US 
    
September  2 Hurricane in the US, one million people sought refuge 
  7 Typhoon No.14 killed 11 people 
  11 The election was held, LDP won an overwhelming victory 
with 296 seats in the House of Representatives  
  13 Six-nation talks aimed at scrapping North Korea's nuclear 
weapons resumed 
  13 Four accountants arrested on charges of falsifying 
accounting reports of Kanebo Ltd 
 ○ 14 Asahi Shimbun national survey shows the cause of victory 
for LDP was 58% the Prime Minister, 18% the party 
 ○ 15  
 ○ 16 Six-nation talks aimed at scrapping North's Korea's 
nuclear weapons froze as North Korea demands U.S. to 
provide a light-water reactor 
 ○ 17  
  17-26 Hurricane Rita formed, hit Southern US on 24th 
 ○ 18 Seiji Maehara became leader of the DP (Democratic Party 
of Japan) 
 ○ 19 Six-nation talks aimed at scrapping North Korea's nuclear 
weapons adopted a joint statement and the talks ended  
  22 The third Koizumi Cabinet was inaugurated on 21st 
  24 In the joint statement on 23rd, G-7 urges an increase in oil 
supply by oil producers  
  25 Expo 2005 Aichi Japan ended 
  26 Train-derailment accident on JR West Co. in Amagasaki, 
first joint memorial service was held on 25th 
  27 A fund headed by financier Yoshiaki Murakami has become 
the top shareholder in Hanshin Electric Railway Co. 
  29 Hannshin Tigers, became this year's Champion in the 
Central League Baseball 
  30 Osaka district court rules Prime Minister Koizumi's visits 
to Yasukuni Shrine unconstitutional  
    
October  1 Japan Highway Public Corp privatized  
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group and UFJ Holdings 
integrated into Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 
  2 Series of terrorist attacks in Bali 
 ○ 7  
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 ○ 8 M7.6 earthquake in Pakistan 
 ○ 9  
 ○ 10  
 ○ 11  
  14 The House of Councilors passed and enacted into law a 
set of bills designed to privatize Japan Post 
  17 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine 
  21 Postal privatization bills promulgated 
  21 Special Diet session ended 
  23 The House of Councilors by-election was held in 
Kanagawa Prefecture 
  23 Former foreign minister and ruling LDP candidate Yoriko 
Kawaguchi scored a clear victory  
  24 Japan may resume beef imports from the U.S. and Canada 
as early as December  
  26 Lotte Marines won the Japan Series baseball 
championship 
Note: ○ indicates the survey was conducted on that day. 
 
